This Article compares and evaluates recent Congressional efforts to improve institutional "cultures" in the private and public sectors.
actors, whose motivations are at a minimum suspect. Second, even assuming the best of intentions and the utmost of human wisdom, central planners cannot forecast the untold costs and benefits to a major governmental reorganization. The Intelligence Reform Act's overhaul of the intelligence community will have certain and substantial costs in the short-term, and very uncertain, if any, benefits in the long term.
this: Federal and state authorities had "deregulated" various aspects of the energy market, allowing companies like Enron to flourish. Throughout the 1990s, Congress, the courts, and regulators "deregulated" still more, the implicit premise being that the market could more efficiently discipline bad actors than either lazy bureaucrats or rapacious plaintiffs' lawyers. 9 Alas, left to its own devices, the market failed to monitor Enron (and several other companies);
10 to state the matter more precisely, personnel within the company and closely connected to it inadequately fulfilled their roles as checks on corporate management.
11
Directors of the board, accountants, lawyers and financial analysts, all of whom should have preserved an independence from top executives, were increasingly aligned with those executives. Walls (yes, the wall metaphor again!) that were designed to channel tasks and duties had crumbled; and Congress, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 12 sought to restore the walls the market had pummeled-walls between accountants and clients, between independent directors and corporate executives, and between investment banks' retail banking divisions and their underwriting arms.
Members of Congress justified all this wall construction and destruction by the need to re-make "cultures" of incompetence and even deceit. With respect to Enron, its culture was studied and pronounced diseased. According to Senator Cantwell, "Enron's corporate culture 9 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate of Denver, N.A. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (eliminating private "aiding and abetting" liability in securities fraud cases); Private Securities Reform Act of 1995 (raising pleading standards for securities fraud); John C. Coffee, Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 BUS. L. REV. 1403 , 1410 (2002 ("There is reason to believe that, from some point in the 1980s until the late 1990s, the SEC shifted its enforcement focus away from actions against Big Five accounting firms."). 10 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) .
fostered a disregard for the American energy customer." 13 Senator Leahy agreed: "The collapse of Enron has become a symbol of a corporate culture where greed has been inflated and accountability devalued." 14 Senator Baucus, musing on Arthur Andersen's complicity in Enron's crimes, noted that "professional firms need to cultivate professional cultures." 15 How true! Members of Congress also cast a critical eye on the culture of intelligence community, which was also judged deficient. As Senator Olympia Stowe, a sponsor of the Intelligence Reform Act, announced in a press release, "We need to continue to move forward with broader reform in Congress so we can change an intelligence community culture that is drastic need of reform." 16 Pounding the same drum, Senator Specter criticized the "cultures of concealment" present in the intelligence community, 17 Senator Chambliss spoke of the need for building a "risk-taking culture" in the intelligence community, 18 and Senator Kyl announced that Congress, through the Intelligence Reform Act "will cultivate a culture within the intelligence community that makes it less likely that people will be willing to do the jobs we are asking them to do, and more likely that they will want to 'play it safe. '" 19 "Culture" might once have referred to a nation's or a people's music, philosophy, art, etc.-that is, the high stuff that lifts us out of our dismal bourgeois existence. community. But trying to figure out what they did mean is extraordinarily difficult. For that matter, the word "culture" does not seem to have any precise meaning when wielded by know-it-alls in the academy. 20 As far as I can tell, "culture" means any set of inner norms or beliefs that motivates a people to act in a certain way. To be more marginally more precise, culture seems to refer to a particular community's background moral rules. If one were inclined to be pompous, one might liken "culture" to what Nietzsche called the "language of good and evil" in which a particular people converse. 21 Of course, no one would say that the CIA or FBI were deceitful prior to 9/11, merely that they were incompetent for failing to pool information with one another. But perhaps we should fault them just as we badger our children to share their favorite trucks and shovels in the playground, justifying this badgering to ourselves and them by the imperative of making them "better" people.
Suffice it to say that "culture" talk is all the rage these days; and Congress has embarked upon massive reorganizations, both in the private sector through the SarbanesOxley Act and in the public sector through the Patriot Act and Intelligence Reform Act, with the nominal goal of changing "cultures" that had somehow failed. Yet at a tactical level, these culture wars are apparently being waged in quite different fashions. In the case of the private sector, Congress diagnosed a culture of too much coziness, and hence the need for walls; in the case of the intelligence community, Congress perceived a culture of too little trust, and hence the need to hack away.
In this Article, I compare and evaluate the Congressional diagnoses and solutions with respect to improving cultures in the private and public sectors. Given the fact that the 9/11
Commission itself has modeled its piece de resistance-the Director of National 20 A Westlaw search in the TP-ALL database on July 8, 2005 of 'culture /10 norm!" generated 2589 hits. 21 The suggestion occurs in FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 35 (1995) .
Intelligence-on a CEO, it would seem to have invited the comparison between public and private sectors. I begin in Part II with an analysis of how Sarbanes-Oxley was designed to improve American corporate culture-by building walls among various groups and subgroups, thereby diminishing trust and coordination. This section is useful in drawing attention to the potential utility of walls in shaping culture in the private sector. In Part III, I argue that, at least at first glance, the approaches taken in Sarbanes-Oxley and the Intelligence Reform Act make sense: The market failed because people did not observe sufficient formalities in their dealings with one another; by contrast, the intelligence community failed precisely because people kept their distance from one another. The way to improve their respective cultures is to build up walls in the one case and to tear them down in the other.
At second glance, however, the story become more complicated, and the Congressional solutions more problematic. As I explore in Part IV, building walls in the private sector increases transaction costs, which may outweigh any benefits in detecting fraud.
And with respect to the intelligence community, are walls necessarily a bad thing?
Compartmentalization of information diminishes risks associated with double agents; redundancy of tasks may increase safety; and segmentation of government agencies may guard against civil liberties violations as well as provide additional spurs to action.
Ultimately, in Part V, I conclude that the attempt to analogize between private and public sector reorganizations is faulty ab initio. Enron, broadly cast to include its accountants at Arthur Andersen, its lawyers at Vinson & Elkins and its various analysts on Wall Street, was badly organized (and did have a corrupt culture, whatever that might mean), and to state the obvious: Enron does not exist any more. Thriving firms in the private sector forge successful, though likely idiosyncratic, cultures designed to exploit business opportunities.
Because the market is self-correcting, regulatory efforts to dictate a particular reorganization or cultural shift are probably unnecessary and possibly harmful.
By contrast, the CIA, FBI, NSA, and all other government agencies operate without fear of bankruptcy, which is to say in the absence of penalties for deficient cultures (or rewards for successful ones). Nonetheless, efforts to re-structure government bureaucracies, nominally to re-make their cultures, should be regarded with caution. First, such efforts will almost inevitably be undertaken by political actors, whose motivations are at a minimum suspect. Second, even assuming the best of intentions and the utmost of human wisdom, central planners cannot forecast the untold costs and benefits to a major governmental reorganization. As I argue below, the Patriot Act's discrete changes to the laws governing information sharing among intelligence officers and law enforcement agents were defensible, for they were narrowly tailored to address grave flaws in the pre-9/11 law. By contrast, the Intelligence Reform Act's overhaul of the intelligence community will have certain and substantial costs in the short-term, and very uncertain, if any, benefits in the long term.
Contrary to the story told by the 9/11 Commission, the intelligence community performed quite well before 9/11, and to the extent that individuals within it did not perform even better it was because of legal barriers (real or imagined) already removed by the Patriot Act.
II. The Enron "Culture" and Two Cheers for Walls
After Enron's collapse, many people took to studying its "culture" and, needless to say, it was pronounced mortally sick. Within the company, an extreme competitiveness was fostered by a "rank and yank" policy that annually meant the dismissal of the bottom 10% of employees in every division. This policy led to a high level of amorality and cronyism. 387, 406-407 (2003) ("The staffs of Enron and Andersen were inextricably intertwined. As noted earlier, David Duncan was a close friend with Mr. Causey, the company's Chief Accounting Officer and the man responsible for approving the SPE transactions that Mr. Fastow handled as both CFO and principal in the off-the-books entities. Further, the employees at Enron were not sure who the Andersen employees were and who worked for Enron; because many Andersen staff had permanent offices at Enron, were often then hired by Enron, and also were beneficiaries of office parties, just as Enron employees were.").
selfish, but in erecting walls between them we ensure that their clashing self interests work to the benefit of society-in effect, Federalist No. 51 applied to the private sector.
The dangers in government are different. There, our paramount concern is that individuals will forget their objective, which is to serve the common good, and instead become dedicated to the service of the government division in which they service. As many have noted, government bureaucracies are inevitably dedicated to their own aggrandizement (both jurisdictional and financial The Patriot Act, belatedly but meaningfully, addressed the problem, by allowing law enforcement officers and intelligence agents to share information. There is a tendency of late, to criticize the FBI's and CIA's pre-9/11 information compartmentalization as not legally required. Richard Posner, for example, writes, "[B]efore 9/11 the CIA and the FBI exaggerated the degree to which they were forbidden to share information, and the FBI exaggerated the degree to which its intelligence officers and its criminal investigators were forbidden to share information with one another." 40 I believe this conclusion is incorrect.
First of all, the claim that the CIA and FBI "exaggerated" the walls between them may be true in some respects, but there were often quite irrational legal prohibitions on the pooling of agents for trying to comply with the law, at least as the Department of Justice and federal judges were relentlessly interpreting it.
In its recommendations for governmental reorganizations, the 9/11 Commission emphasized the need for unity-again and again. Its four overarching recommendations were to promote: "unity of effort across the foreign-domestic divide" (p. 400), "unity of effort in the intelligence community," (407), "unity of effort in sharing information" (416), and "unity of effort in the Congress" (419). In its subsidiary recommendations, the Commission extolled "the virtue of joint planning and the advantage of having someone in charge to ensure a unified effort" (401) and "a civilian-led unified joint command for counterterrorism" (403);
and it recommended the creation of "a center for joint operational and joint intelligence" (403, emphasis in original), the creation of a new agency, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), that would "lead strategic analysis, pooling all-source intelligence, foreign and domestic" (404) and the creation of a new post, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and who will "oversee national intelligence" and "manage the national intelligence program" (411).
The political elites, including President Bush and his then-campaign opponent, John F.
Kerry, as well as the vast majority of the members of Congress, responded almost immediately to the 9/11 Commission Report with fulsome praise; and most, although not quite all, of its recommendations found their way into law a few months after its release. The centerpiece of the Intelligence Reform Act, as already indicated, is the creation of a DNI who will streamline personnel, budgetary and policy decisions among the intelligence community as a whole. Following the 9/11 Commission Report, the Act also created a new agency, the National Counterterrorism Center, with access to information drawn from all agencies and which will conduct "strategic operational planning. 56 What makes this proposal, which fortunately was not adopted in the Intelligence Reform Act, all the more mysterious is the fact that, by all accounts, the CIA paramilitary teams performed extraordinarily well in Afghanistan. In general, the decision to demote the CIA in the newly fangled intelligence community given that, of al the agencies, the CIA comes off relatively well in the 9/11 Commission Report. See id. at 349 ("Before 9/11, no agency had more responsibility-or did more-to attack Al Qaeda, working day and night, than the CIA.").
sector we realize that individuals perform better at specialized tasks, and every expansion of a job's scope comes at a potential cost in terms of worker efficiency. A Defense Department analyst studying Russian submarines may, in the course of his work, come across an item of broader interest. But to the extent that we remorselessly badger the poor fellow with the shrill commands "Share! Cooperate!" we will presumably be distracting him from locating Russian subs.
All this wall destruction is justified by the need to remake the intelligence community's "culture"; there is, however, some doubt as to whether that culture will improve when we replace competing agencies, each with their own esprit de corps, with one big blob of an agency. employees must wonder why they are undertaking sacrifices for a country, typified by a everwary and often insulting Congress, that so thoroughly distrusts them. The wholesale resignations at the CIA whenever a DCI departs suggests that the CIA employee's ego is relatively "fragile" and that he or she needs to feel "appreciated." 58 As the CIA's prominence in the newly fashioned "no walls" intelligence community declines, one wonders if the CIA will continue to attract and retain its top employees, or whether they will flee for the private sectors, leaving the bureaucratic deadbeats behind. 59 So much for fostering a culture of creativity and imagination.
Indeed, perhaps the most striking "intelligence failure" of the 9/11 Commission, and the Congress that adopted most of its recommendations-and here I use intelligence in the everyday sense of dumb vs. smart-is the assumption that the twin goals of organizational coordination and organizational creativity are compatible. As I earlier suggested, from the point of view of the young legal associate, a partner's request to remain in the loop induces terror for it necessarily multiplies one's work. Nor am I convinced that, from the point of view of the client, it is advantageous to have yet another draftsman at the table. Leaving aside the added cost, the more partners on a brief, the more difficult it is to stake out a truly creative position. What one partner considers inventive, the other four will likely regard as outlandish, and thus does it end up on the cutting room floor. The best legal briefs that I have ever read are the work of one or two people, who disappeared into an office for a few weeks and 58 POSNER, supra note 40, at 45-46. 59 Of course, other organizations, such as the NCTC, may emerge as the new "elites," but that will take some time (5 years, 10 years?) over the course of which we must assume that the talent pool in the intelligence community will be lower than what it is now. In addition, once a new elite develops, it will fashion, formally or informally, walls that segregate itself from other organizations that it deems inferior. Many in the CIA reportedly think that the acronym DIA, which most of us assume stands for Defense Intelligence Agency, in fact represents Da Idiot Agency. The DIA returns the favor by referring to the CIA as "Clowns in Action." emerged with a final product, to be massaged but not dramatically altered by others. And not surprisingly, when we consider truly creative endeavors, it is almost impossible to name a great novel or poem or play or sculpture or painting that was "co-produced." Turning to the intelligence community, the greater the emphasis on sharing and coordination and team-work, the harder it will likely be for one or two courageous analysts to stake out a controversial position and argue it forcefully.
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V. Can the Private Sector Teach Government Anything?
In 2000, Fortune magazine ranked all American corporations on a number of matrices, and one stood out for praise. It showed extraordinarily high profits year after year, and the magazine crowned it No. 1 for innovativeness and No. 2 in attracting and retaining talent.
That company ceased to exist a year and half later-its name was Enron.
It is comical, albeit darkly so, to read articles about the "Enron culture" pre-and postcrash. In its heady days, Enron was celebrated for its free-wheeling and innovative culture.
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A few years later, the same "rank and yank" culture was said to be central to Enron's failure. 62 It is fairly easy to understand why a "rank and yank" culture might excite disdain in the academic community, whose denizens either hunger for, or wallow in, the ultimate in job security-tenure. That being said, it is hard to argue with success, and the world's most successful company, at least rated by market capitalization, is General Electric, and its longtime CEO Jack Welch famously employed a "fire the bottom 10%" approach similar to that used at Enron. Still, one cannot say that any particular business culture is good or bad, at least if the criterion is making money. agents, but even in the best company one must assume some residual loss. Although agency costs have long been the subject of academic study, 66 there has lately been a growing interest in the way "bounded rationality" plays out in the corporate setting. It turns out that cognitive biases are rife in boardrooms and offices just as they are in every other setting that human being inhabit. Indeed, in certain respects biases are most likely to flourish in business settings:
High levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy are associated with aggressiveness, perseverance, and optimal risk-taking. These biases may be particularly adaptive in business settings, where decisiveness and aggressiveness are considered indicators of a successful manager. Certainly, overconfidence at times leads to disaster and severe career failure. Those who fail too visibly are often weeded out. However, there is little evidence that successful managers learn humility very well. Instead, they recharacterize their minor failures in self-serving terms. They take the apparent absence of major failures, maybe from luck as much as anything else, as proof of superior skill. High levels of optimism and confidence are not only good internal motivators, but they also influence others; exhibitions of confidence and optimism make people more persuasive and influential. There is a staggeringly large literature, ignored in its entirety by the 9/11 Commission, devoted to understanding how corporations can minimize the effect of optimism and commitment biases in its managers. Likewise, there is a staggeringly large literature, ignored by the 9/11 Commission, as to how corporations improve "upward information flow" to ensure that subordinates generate the best possible data and do not simply mimic their managers' views.
Companies in the private sector operate in a highly competitive environment, and market forces reward those companies that best counter the effect of cognitive biases. But there does not appear to be any single "solution." In banks, for example, it has been found useful to separate lending groups (perhaps prone to optimism bias) from workout groups (perhaps overly prone to discount the possibility of creative thinking). 68 At Intel, by contrast, long-time CEO Andy Grove encouraged a free-wheeling flow of ideas, his motto being, "Let chaos reign, then reign in the chaos." Grove argued this culture allowed him to recognize and predict "strategic inflection points," that is, business upheavals triggered by changes in technology or regulation or competition. For Intel, the critical moment was in the 1980s, when it abandoned the dynamic random access memory market, in which it had thrived, to pursue the microprocessor market, which meant the firing of thousands of employees and a calamitous half billion dollar write-off when a technical glitch was encountered. 69 Grove's decision was quickly validated, and is now consistently lauded in business school classes as a model of strategic leadership. Interestingly, even at Intel there was not quite as much honest "upward information flow" as Grove had assumed, which may explain why Intel persisted in the memory market after it became clear (at least retrospectively) that a move to microprocessors was unavoidable.
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What does all this suggest about reforming "the intelligence community?" One conclusion might be that the goal of forging a singular culture is misguided. The various segments of the community are engaged in quite different tasks and might attract different kinds of people. The sort of person who could thrive as an NSA analyst might be less well suited to work in the CIA. The 9/11 Commission, and the Congress that adopted most of its recommendations, ignored the substantial benefits in allowing different organizations to develop idiosyncratic cultures through specialization on discrete tasks. For example, the Commission apparently criticizes the NSA for not following up on information gleaned in late 1999 about communications between men named Khalid, Nawaf, and Salem. "Working-level officials in the intelligence community knew little more than this. . . . The NSA did not think that its job was to research these identities. It saw itself as an agency to support intelligence consumers such as the CIA. The NSA tried to respond energetically to any request made.
But it waited to be asked." 71 The reason that the NSA had this view of its own responsibilities, apparently unbeknownst to the 9/11 Commission, is that Executive Order 12333 specifically defines the NSA's roles as the collection, processing and dissemination of information in accordance with the DCI. And this makes a lot of sense: "Otherwise, the The 9/11 Commission urged Congress to institutionalize a culture of creativity in the intelligence community, and Congress codified the recommendation, incoherently and one must assume ineffectually, by authorizing the DNI to create myriad "red teams" to play devil's advocate. 73 But it is not at all clear that, for much of the intelligence community, creativity is a job requirement: NSA analysts should be meticulous, not creative.
Furthermore, creativity is often problematic, especially in the public sector. Someone who comes up with an innovative idea or prepares to chart a revolutionary path in the private sector, as Grove did when he entered the microprocessor market, is quickly held in check by profits and losses. A creative idea that loses a company millions of dollars year after year (and most of them do) will soon be abandoned, or the company bankrupted; but this is not the case in the public sector. Indeed, in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense was freed from the "tyranny of scenario plausibility" and promptly embarked on a spending spree that has saddled the country to this day with countless wasteful projects. 74 It's swell to "let chaos rein" in the private sector, but it does not seem like a good idea in the public sector.
To the extent that one really wanted to generate a culture of creativity, a multi-billion dollar reshuffling and enlargement of existing and newly created bureaucracies is not the most 81 In a telling passage, the 9/11 Commission Report quotes one FBI agent criticizing an informational "wall" and even noting that "someday someone will die" as a result of the legal barriers. 9/11 Commission Report at 271. The Commission Report then goes out of its way to exonerate Member Gorelick of any wrongdoing, noting that technically her 1995 memorandum would not have foreclosed the communication in question. Id at 539 n. 83. The Report nonetheless does not endorse the memorandum, in fact remaining dubitante on this point: "[w]hatever the merits of the March 1995 Gorelick memorandum. . . . " Id. Truly, this is bizarre. Either the memorandum was right, both as a matter of law and policy, or it was wrong. Surely, the Commission should have taken a position on this vital point, but then again how could it, given that Gorelick was herself on the Commission. Instead of focusing on this point, the Report complains broadly about the FBI's "bureaucratic culture"
Turning to the recommendations, the Commission (and later Congress's) fixation on bureaucratic reshufflings apparently reflects the idea that a decision-maker acting upon incomplete information will make mistakes, and what is needed is to disturb existing informational relationships. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how internal bureaucratic changes will do much to remedy the problem. Schematically, the intelligence community used to look like this:
Diagram 1 Now it looks like that:
Diagram 2 There are more boxes and more dotted lines in Diagram 2, but precisely how this will facilitate the upward flow of accurate information remains anyone's guess. And if interesting morsels of information do rise, there is no certainty that the people at the top of the food chain will bother to listen. In sum, organizations in the private sector forge idiosyncratic cultures in response to market conditions. Government attempts to remake firm cultures are almost by definition misguided; for most firms that exist, and certainly the ones that thrive, already have successful cultures: If they hadn't, they wouldn't be here and surely wouldn't consistently be turning a profit. Government organizations, by contrast, face no economic pressures. They may adapt cultures that are successful in terms of motivating employees to seek and promote the public good; but just as likely, government organizations adapt perverse cultures in which the overriding objective is ingratiating itself with the dispenser of funds (usually Congress).
Indeed, the latter organizations likely will succeed in competition with the former, at least in the warped Darwinian world of government.
VI. Conclusion
This article is a plea for a truce in the culture wars. 83 Congress is not qualified to remake corporate cultures. Inevitably, any reforms Congress decrees will be rationalized with reference to failed companies that had-by definition-failed cultures. (which is why this should be left to the market). Nor can one individual (or even an 8-person commission of philosopher-kings) design a perfect intelligence community, calibrating the walls and barriers perfectly to account for the various logistical and civil liberties requirements. This fact does not relieve us of the need to construct an intelligence community, but it would suggest a certain humility in approaching this undertaking.
So had I been asked to participate in the 9/11 Commission, my approach would have been as follows: All things considered, the intelligence community did not do all that badly.
The Commission harped on supposed shortcomings of the intelligence community, but my reaction when reading the Report was often quite the opposite. The picture of the intelligence community that comes across on most of the pages of the Report is of truly well-meaning and energetic public servants, who may have misunderstood some of the legal barriers to 86 Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Sharing, Rand Publication.
information sharing, which was hardly surprising given the complexity of the law and the sparse and contradictory guidance supplied by their superiors. 87 Because the intelligence community as currently constituted performed relatively well, structural tinkering is preferable to radical overhaul. The Patriot Act's amendments to FISA and grand jury secrecy rules make sense, for they eliminate some of the more plainly nonsensical features of pre-9/11 law. Beyond that, however, the radical changes dictated by the Intelligence Reform Act may or may not have some salutary consequences five or ten years out, but we know with certainty that they will cause upheaval, and a consequent reduction of efficiency, in the short term.
Given the uncertain long-term benefits and the certain short-term costs, such massive reorganizations should be regarded with some caution.
I fear that there after some future terrorist attack, another Commission may inaugurate further structural upheaval. The expected overhaul at that point will consist of stripping domestic intelligence work out of the purview of the FBI and creating an entirely new bureaucracy altogether-a counterpart to Britain's MI-5. There is some abstract logic to support such a change; and indeed, such a change makes more logical sense than most of the reorganizations recently undertaken. The basic idea is that intelligence work should be done by spies, not cops, and therefore should be outside the FBI's bailiwick. 951, 957-71 (2003) . Also impressive were the labors of the FBI's New York office, which tried to pursue an investigation with respect to two 9/11 hijackers, only to face interference due to perceived legal barriers. See 9/11 Commission Report at 270-72. Nor was the CIA nearly as ineffectual as some have claimed. For example, "CIA assets in Afghanistan" correctly reported that Bin Laden was in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1999 and pitched the idea of killing him then and there. High level officials who-surprise, surprise, go unnamed in the 9/11 Commission Report-vetoed the idea. See id. at 140 ("'It was a fat pitch, a home run.' . . . When came back that they should stand down, 'we all just slumped.'"). If bureaucrats in the Department of Education were half as energetic and public-spirited as the members of the intelligence community depicted in the 9/11 Commission Report, American schoolchildren might be mastering classical Greek at age 12.
not convinced that, in actual practice, such a reorganization will prove beneficial. True, the United States is unique among Western nations in having its domestic intelligence conducted by an arm of law enforcement. But it is hard to know which structure is necessarily better. In America, domestic intelligence is conducted by the FBI, which can threaten people with criminal prosecution, and this is a powerful motivator to talk. By contrast, Britain's MI-5
does not have prosecutorial powers; criminal investigations of domestic enemy infiltrators must be passed over to Scotland Yard. 88 There are costs and benefits to keeping domestic intelligence within the FBI, and perhaps we should just leave well enough alone.
The 9/11 Commission and the Congress that enacted the Intelligence Reform Act obsessed about forging a new culture in the intelligence community, but the reality is that the intelligence community cannot forge a culture antithetical to the spirit of the general culture of society. At least in a democracy, if society at large thinks that spies are wicked and to be distrusted, it is unlikely that responsive political elites will tolerate a truly invigorated intelligence community. Although not at all congenial to the modern democratic spirit, it might be useful for some future commission to lay out some facts with clarity, such as: The reason the CIA and the rest of intelligence community exist in the first place is that there are evil people in this world who want to kill us. Yes, he who fights monsters must be wary of becoming one, but an even greater danger facing many Western liberal democracies is the delusion that there are no monsters at all.
